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The new dataset provides a rich source 
of data to reexamine existing tax treaty 
policy, inform negotiation positions, 
and assess treaty networks. For the 
first time, it provides a tool to analyze 
trends in the content of tax treaties, 
across individual agreements, over time, 
and between countries. To illustrate 
the value of such an approach, we 
replicate a study by Barthel, Busse, and 
Neumayer (2009), which found a positive 
association between the presence of 
a tax treaty and the bilateral stock of 
FDI. We show that this effect is mainly 
driven by the withholding tax rates in the 
treaty rather than by other provisions 
affecting taxing rights such as permanent 
establishment. If the outcomes of this 
proof-of-concept replication are borne 
out in future research, this would suggest 
that negotiators can seek the maximum 
protection of source taxing rights in other 
parts of the treaty, knowing that this is 
unlikely to dilute investment-promoting 
impacts.
A B S T R A C T
This paper introduces the 
new Tax Treaties Explorer 
dataset, developed with 
support from the World 
Bank and the G-24, and 
illustrates its use for 
research by tax treaty 
negotiators, policy makers, 
and researchers. 
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8.
MTI INSIGHT
Using New Data to Support Tax 
Treaty Negotiation
>>>
Bilateral tax treaties are intended to create a stable and attractive tax environment, encouraging 
trade investment while providing revenue authorities with tools for mutual assistance and 
dispute resolution. There are over 3,000 such bilateral tax treaties. However, these negotiated 
agreements can also limit states’ ability to tax income earned within their borders by investors 
and service providers from the treaty partner, often referred to as their “taxing rights.” They affect 
the taxation of most cross-border activity, which makes up an estimated 80 percent of foreign 
direct investment (FDI).1
> > >  P O L I C Y  D E B A T E  O N  T W O  F R O N T S
Broadly speaking, policy debates concerning tax treaties divide into two major categories. The 
first concerns the misuse of treaties to obtain benefits not intended when they were concluded, 
principally by “treaty shopping” via investment hubs. Public debate about tax avoidance over 
the past decade—in tandem with the work of the Group of Twenty (G-20) and Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS)—
has led to changes in tax treaty norms designed to prevent the treaties from being exploited in 
this way. 
Second, questions are arising as to whether the revenue costs of curbing taxing rights are 
justified by any gains. Such questions are relevant both at the level of norms embodied in 
multilateral model treaties and when considering the bilateral treaties that countries negotiate in 
practice. Illustrating this concern are changes to model treaties such as the new Article 12A and 
proposed Article 12B of the United Nations (UN) Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries (“UN model”), as well as the proposal under consideration 
in the OECD/G-20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS (IF) to create a “new taxing right.”2  The tension 
here is typically styled as a compromise between the taxing rights of the “source” (capital and 
service-importing) and “residence” (exporting) jurisdictions (Brooks and Krever 2015; Eyitayo-
Oyesode 2020). In many cases, however, curbs on source taxing rights accrue to multinational 
investors rather than to residence country governments (Zolt 2018).
> >  T A X  T R E A T I E S :  A  G L O B A L  P O L I C Y  I S S U E
1. The estimate covers the period 2014 to 2018. Javier Garcia-Bernardo, personal communication, September 21, 2020. On 
file with the authors.
2.     The UN Model “seeks to assist countries in drafting and negotiating bilateral tax treaties, with a view to maintaining the de-
sired balance between obtaining more tax revenue from foreign investment and preserving [an] investment-friendly climate, 
in support of their development goals” (Trepelkov 2014). The new Article 12A refers to “Fees for Technical Services” and the 
proposed Article 12B to “Income from Automated Digital Services.”
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> > >  P O L I C Y - D R I V E N  N E E D S  F O R  D A T A
These policy debates have exposed a growing gap in the 
availability of policy-relevant data and research. The demand 
for such analysis is threefold. 
>>>  NEED FOR TREATY DEVELOPMENT AND 
REVISION
First, governments are reexamining their existing treaty 
networks and developing treaty policies, spurred on in part by 
growing attention from campaigners (ActionAid 2016; Alencar, 
Avan, and Olwenyi 2020). In Africa, treaties with Mauritius 
have been terminated by the governments of Senegal, 
Rwanda, South Africa, and Zambia. Argentina and Mongolia 
are among others to have terminated treaties with investment 
hubs in recent years. The Netherlands signaled a willingness 
to renegotiate its tax treaties with low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) and to take a more flexible approach in 
areas such as withholding tax (WHT) rates, while Ireland 
issued a public consultation on its treaty policy toward lower-
income countries. 
The age of many lower-income countries’ treaties with OECD 
countries is especially of concern given the improvements to 
treaty norms in recent years. Half the tax treaties in force in 
lower-income countries today are more than 20 years old, 
and one-tenth were concluded before 1980—when the first 
UN Model Tax Convention was published—and have not 
been updated since. A handful of these even predate the 
lower-income country’s independence from colonial rule. It 
is a significant task to analyze an aging treaty network and 
determine the best course of action, and countries will need 
to identify the highest-risk treaties on which to focus as well 
as the realistic potential for improvement based on precedent.
>>>  NEED FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
A second need for new data is to offer countries better 
guidance about the potential costs and benefits of tax treaties. 
For most lower-income countries, the constraints on taxing 
rights are a straight revenue cost in static terms, mitigated 
by the hope that the treaty will stimulate investment and in 
turn increase welfare and expand the tax base. Competition 
to attract inward investment has clearly motivated decisions to 
conclude tax treaties (Barthel and Neumayer 2012; Hearson 
2021), and some research suggests that treaty shopping may 
create added pressure on countries to revisit their tax treaty 
policy and therefore to negotiate new agreements to take back 
control of their fiscal policy (Arel-Bundock 2017). 
Yet what is in doubt is the extent to which any such gains 
justify the revenue forgone by the source country (Leduc and 
Michielse 2021). As noted tax lawyer and scholar Eric Zolt 
argues, tax treaties are a form of tax incentive and should 
be analyzed using the same tools (Zolt 2018). To that end, 
there are two sides to the equation: costs and benefits. It has 
become relatively common to estimate the costs of restrictions 
on dividend and interest withholding, usually in static terms, but 
with some estimates that take into account behavioral change 
(Balabushko et al. 2017; Janský and Šedivý 2018; McGauran 
2013). Aside from cost estimates that focus on the presence 
or absence of a treaty (Beer and Loeprick 2021), there have 
been no other attempts to quantify the costs of various treaty 
provisions such as permanent establishment (PE) definitions.
As for the benefits, a wave of recent scholarship (discussed 
in section 2 of this paper) has deployed network analysis 
techniques and microdata to attempt to measure the real 
investment-promotion effects of particular treaty provisions, 
including in regard to treaty shopping. Again, these attempts 
have so far been largely limited to dividend and interest 
withholding and to FDI. Thus, when countries make decisions 
about tax treaties, they have precious little evidence 
concerning the costs and benefits of other restrictions on their 
taxing rights.
>>>  NEED TO BUILD NEGOTIATION CAPACITY
Finally, lower-income countries need more easily 
accessible data to strengthen their capacity for negotiation 
and renegotiation. The publication of a revised UN Manual for 
the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed 
and Developing Countries (UN 2019) and the Platform for 
Collaboration on Tax’s “Toolkit on Tax Treaty Negotiations” 
(PCT 2021) are examples of the renewed focus on this 
topic, as is the provision of technical assistance through Tax 
Inspectors Without Borders.3 At the regional level, bodies such 
as the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) and the Inter 
American Centre of Tax Administrations (CIAT) have invested 
in tools and training for their members in treaty negotiation, 
and the number of regional model treaties is growing.
 
Still, some lower-income countries continue to negotiate and 
renegotiate costly tax treaties. For example, in recent years 
Benin, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Guinea, 
Mauritania, and Nigeria have concluded treaties that eliminate 
all or most WHT rates. Kenya’s 2012 treaty with Mauritius 
was struck down by its High Court following a challenge 
from civil society organizations (Ogembo 2019) and has now 
3. Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB) is a joint initiative of the OECD and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to support countries in building tax audit capacity, 
with a focus on multinational enterprises’ compliance. For more information, see the TIWB website: http://tiwb.org/. 
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been renegotiated in a much stronger form. Zambia’s now-
terminated treaty with Mauritius had been signed as recently 
as 2011. Stronger, data-driven analysis will help countries to 
develop tax treaty policies that stipulate whom they will negoti-
ate with, on what terms, and how to establish their positions 
and prepare for negotiations, including by analyzing precedent 
(Mutava 2019).
> > >  C O N T R I B U T I O N S  O F  T H I S  P A -
P E R 
This paper introduces the new Tax Treaties Explorer 
dataset—developed with support from the World Bank and 
the Intergovernmental Group of 24 on International Monetary 
Affairs and Development (G-24)—and explores some of its 
insights regarding these three data gaps. Building on prior 
work published by ActionAid and the International Centre for 
Tax and Development (ICTD) (Hearson 2016), the new dataset 
captures 28 clauses, most of them reflecting the balance 
between source and residence taxation, across almost every 
tax treaty signed by low- and middle-income economies. 
This dataset enables, for the first time, broad comparisons 
and analyses between countries and over time for over 
2,500 treaties plus amending instruments. It offers the 
potential for new research into the impact of specific treaty 
provisions beyond dividend and interest withholding taxes. 
The dataset is accompanied by an online tool (available at 
http://www.treaties.tax) that acts as an accessible entry point 
to understand treaties in comparative context. 
The next section discusses the state of knowledge on tax 
treaties in LMICs; introduces the dataset in section 3; and 
presents some initial descriptive findings, illustrating how 
the data might be used, in section 4. Section 5 includes a 
replication study that demonstrates how the dataset can help 
to refine existing knowledge about the impacts of tax treaties. 
Starting from the model of Barthel et al. (2010), which finds 
a relationship between tax treaties and FDI, we replace the 
binary measure of the presence of a treaty with indexes 
from the dataset. This tentative analysis suggests that more 
residence-based treaties exert a stronger positive impact 
on FDI but that this effect is driven by lower withholding tax 
(WHT) rates, not by other treaty provisions.
9USING NEW DATA TO SUPPORT TAX TREATY NEGOTIATION <<<
> > >  B E T T E R  D A T A ,  B E T T E R  T R E A T Y 
P O L I C Y  A N D  P R E P A R A T I O N  F O R 
N E G O T I A T I O N S
Data are essential to underpin a strong negotiating position. 
Precedent in a country’s own treaty network, that of its 
negotiating partner, and trends in treaty negotiations more 
broadly can all either reinforce or undermine a position. As 
the Platform for Collaboration on Tax’s Toolkit on Tax Treaty 
Negotiations notes, even before negotiations begin, “a 
country’s decision to negotiate a tax treaty should be based 
on an analysis of the . . . [other country’s] recent tax treaties in 
order to identify the main elements of its tax treaty policy” (PCT 
2021, 7). For example, the United States will not agree to a tax 
sparing clause—a “deal-breaker” preventing negotiations with 
some LMICs (Brown 2020). And although the United Kingdom 
once routinely offered an article on withholding taxes on fees 
for technical services to lower-income countries, in recent 
years it has refused to do so (Hearson 2017). 
Guidance on treaty negotiations points to the importance 
of preparing for negotiations by reviewing one’s own recent 
treaties, as well as those of the treaty partner, with countries in 
similar regions or income groups (PCT 2021, 19; UN 2019, 28). 
Furthermore, outside of negotiations themselves, countries 
are increasingly seeking to review their existing networks to 
identify vulnerabilities and opportunities to strengthen them. 
Because many lower-income countries currently lack policies 
on tax treaty negotiation, such reviews should strengthen the 
process of treaty making and the outcomes of negotiations 
(Mutava 2019).
Data availability—or the lack thereof—imposes constraints 
on governments and other stakeholders who are attempting to 
analyze treaty networks, whether their own, those of potential 
treaty partners, or those of their neighbors and competitors. 
Although treaty texts often can be obtained from government 
websites, they are not always easy to find and may not 
be translated into an accessible language. Subscription 
databases have more comprehensive coverage, but access 
may be prohibitively expensive. In any case, the analysis of 
a large number of treaties requires specialized knowledge 
and can be time-consuming. Studying the network of each 
current and potential treaty partner rapidly becomes a major 
challenge.
Some information, most commonly on WHT rates, has 
been extracted from treaties and made available in a quick-
reference tabulated format by various organizations, but such 
data have downsides:
• They encourage a focus on quantitative treaty 
provisions at the expense of others that may be just as 
pertinent. 
• Their utility as tools for quick-reference comparison 
frequently break down when rates are stratified in ways not 
captured by basic templates—for example, if there are multiple 
rates for different types of royalty. 
• The variations in wording found across many treaties 
mean that a simple search for specific terms in a treaty’s 
text cannot reliably establish the presence or absence of a 
particular provision. 
• Taxing rights may be established in places other than 
those indicated by the model treaties—including protocols 
attached to treaties at the time of signature, or protocols and 
other amending instruments concluded at a later date. 
Purposive interpretation across many treaties and articles 
therefore requires a significant investment of time.
 
The absence of an open database of coded treaty content 
means that the exercise of tabulating common standardized 
variations in treaties has been performed repeatedly by 
researchers, duplicating effort and inevitably leading to partial 
analyses that are usually focused on only one or several 
countries or clauses (Brooks 2010; Daurer 2014; Daurer and 
Krever 2012; Hearson and Kangave 2016; Li 2012). (For more 
comprehensive coverage, see Wijnen, de Goede, and Alessi 
2012; Wijnen and de Goede 2013.)
Although academic research often employs a heuristic that 
any capital- and service-importing country will seek to retain 
as many source taxing rights as possible during a negotiation 
(Chisik and Davies 2004; Rixen 2011; Rixen and Schwarz 
2009), the picture is more complex. Examining countries’ 
actual treaty networks shows a wide variation in the content 
of tax treaties negotiated within the current parameters. For 
example, Daurer and Krever (2012) demonstrate that African 
countries’ treaties are less source-based than those of Asian 
countries with the same treaty partners, while Li (2012) shows 
an evolution over time in the negotiated content of China’s 
treaties. 
Hearson (2018) suggests that power asymmetries and lack 
of negotiating experience both translate into greater restrictions 
on source taxing rights. Analysis by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) suggests that treaties are more likely to include a 
provision on capital gains on shares deriving value indirectly 
from immovable property if one of the signatories is a resource-
rich or low-tax jurisdiction—and that such provisions are more 
> >  T H E  R O L E  O F  D A T A  I N  T A X  T R E A T Y  M A K I N G
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common as the difference between the two jurisdictions’ tax 
rates on capital gains increases (PCT 2020, 33). 
LMICs’ preferences can be observed in a variety of sources, 
including the contents of regional model treaties, and in 
published disagreements with provisions of the OECD and 
regional models (Vega and Rudyk 2011; West 2021). We might 
presume that these observed variations in preferences reflect 
a combination of countries’ tax policy priorities at the time 
of signature as well as learning and capacity development, 
political motivations, and the power dynamics of negotiation 
(Hearson 2018; Kangave 2009; Mutava 2019).
> > >  A  D R I V E  T O  I M P R O V E  R E S E A R C H 
O N  C O S T S  A N D  B E N E F I T S
A most basic observation about the academic literature 
on tax treaties is that the findings concerning the costs and 
benefits of tax treaties are inconclusive, especially in the case 
of lower-income countries. Studies of the impact on FDI during 
the 2000s produced a mixture of positive, null, and negative 
results (Sauvant and Sachs 2009).
>>>  IMPROVED APPROACHES
In recent years, this picture has changed as researchers 
began to develop ever more sophisticated models (Table 1). 
A review of these studies points to several attributes in which 
new approaches improve on their predecessors:
• More precise sources of data. Although aggregate 
FDI statistics can still produce interesting findings, studies 
increasingly use bilateral FDI data or firm-level microdata. 
The latter may be preferable since bilateral FDI data have 
coverage and accuracy issues, especially for lower-income 
countries. 
• Salient features of home countries’ taxation of foreign 
income. Consideration of these features may have a material 
impact on the gains to investors from tax treaties. Credit 
systems and controlled foreign company rules, for example, 
may soak many of them up, diluting treaties’ impact on 
investment to these countries. 
• Models’ focus on indirect investment structures. 
Whether for tax treaty shopping or otherwise, recent literature 
shows the use of network analysis to identify the most cost-
effective pathways for firms to repatriate income before and 
after a direct treaty is concluded between two countries. To 
do this effectively, it is necessary to consider the attributes of 
potential conduit jurisdictions’ tax systems, as well as of their 
tax treaty networks. 
• Consideration of treaty attributes rather than just a 
binary variable—that is, whether the treaty exists or not. To 
date, most studies attempting to estimate the investment 
effects of tax treaties have either disregarded the content of the 
treaty altogether or focused on dividend WHT rates. A few have 
also considered WHT rates on interest and royalty payments 
as well as “tax sparing” clauses. As noted in the Platform 
for Collaboration on Tax’s toolkit, current methodologies to 
estimate the revenue forgone from tax treaties are also limited 
to restrictions on dividends, interest, and royalties WHT (PCT 
2021, 9).
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>>>  STRENGTHENING RESEARCH TO BENEFIT 
LMICS
How can this body of research be strengthened to the benefit 
of negotiators from lower-income countries, so that they can 
maximize the benefits gained while minimizing the revenue 
forgone? Eric Zolt summarized the key questions in 2018:
While the traditional focus has been on whether 
developing countries should enter into tax treaties with 
developed countries, the better questions may be what 
form the treaties should take and with whom developing 
countries should enter into treaties. (Zolt 2018, 147)
To answer these questions, we first need better data and 
econometric techniques. The recent publication of studies that 
consider some salient features of potential treaty partners and 
the impact of certain treaty articles is a positive development. 
Yet, where studies have considered dividend withholding 
alongside the impact of treaties as a whole, the latter has an 
independent effect, indicating that other aspects of tax treaties 
contribute to their investment effects (Marques and Pinho 
2014; Weyzig 2013). Conversely, Azémar and Darmaphala 
(2019) find that only treaties with a tax sparing provision had 
any impact on investment. A next generation of research 
should consider the costs and benefits of other provisions that 
may affect investment decisions, including other WHTs, PE 
definitions, and capital gains taxes as well as the benefits that 
accrue from having any tax treaty at all, regardless of its terms. 
Second, while network analysis has permitted a focus on 
investment diversion via conduits, it should be remembered 
that the key concern for a capital-importing country is how to 
increase its total stock of inward investment as well as how 
to maximize the revenue from that stock. For example, one 
interpretation of research by Beer and Loeprick (2021) is that 
aggregate FDI in an economy increases, albeit alongside 
declining tax revenue, when firms can minimize tax costs 
through treaty shopping. Balabushko et al. (2017) also find a 
behavioral response from reducing or increasing WHT rates 
in treaties. 
Third, research to date has largely concentrated on FDI, 
a choice that is certainly logical. The impact of some treaty 
provisions may be felt elsewhere, particularly on portfolio 
investment, trade in goods and services, transfers of 
intellectual property, and movement of people. 
Fourth, the welcome inclusion of attributes of home country 
jurisdictions could be expanded to consider attributes of 
host countries. Several cross-country studies have already 
attempted to use host country WHT rates, but the key challenge 
>  >  >
T A B L E  1  - Studies of the Relationship Between Tax Treaties and Investment Since 2010
STUDY TYPE OF DATA HOME COUNTRY TAX SYSTEM
TREATY 
SHOPPING TREATY CONTENT CONSIDERED
Azémar and Darmaphala (2019) Bilaterial FDI Yes Yes Treaty binaryTax sparing clauses
Baker (2014) Bilateral FDI No No Treaty binary
Balabushko et al. (2017) Microdata n.a. (Ukraine) Yes Dividend, interest, and royalty WHT




Blonigen, Oldenski, and Sly (2014) Microdata n.a. (US) No Treaty binaryMAP (inferred)
Dressler (2012) Microdata n.a. (Germany) Yes Dividend WHT
Hong (2018) Bilateral FDI No Yes Dividend WHT
Marques and Pinho (2014) Microdata Yes No Treaty binaryDividend WHT
Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) Microdata n.a. (Germany) Yes Dividend WHT
Petkova, Stasio, and Zagler (2020) Bilateral FDI Yes Yes Dividend WHT
van ’t Riet and Lejour (2018) Bilateral FDI Yes Yes Dividend WHT
Weyzig (2013) Microdata n.a. (Netherlands) Yes
Treaty binary
Dividend WHT
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; MAP = Mutual Agreement Procedure; n.a. = not applicable; WHT = withholding tax
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> >  A  N E W  T A X  T R E A T I E S  D A T A S E T
During 2019 and 2020, a dataset was assembled comprising 
2,533 bilateral tax treaties, 8 multilateral tax treaties, 272 
bilateral amending instruments, and 687 modifications 
through the OECD/G-20 Multilateral Instrument to Implement 
Treaty-Related Aspects of BEPS (MLI).4 As far as possible, 
the Tax Treaties Explorer dataset includes all treaties signed 
by 118 countries: those that are, or were until recently, LMICs; 
all countries in  Africa, and all members of the G-24.5 Lists of 
treaties were compiled from the International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation (IBFD), supplemented with governments’ own 
lists published online.
Most tax treaty negotiations use as their starting point the 
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
(“OECD model”) and UN model tax conventions, and 
almost all treaties follow a structure based on these models. 
Treaties based on the OECD model generally impose greater 
restrictions on a country’s ability to tax inward investment, 
whereas the UN model makes amendments to the OECD 
model that leave more of these rights intact. In the Tax 
Treaties Explorer dataset, each of the fields (table 2) is based 
on a provision of the model treaties—whether the provision 
represents a difference between the UN and OECD models, 
a clause that is in both models but does not always appear in 
negotiated treaties, or a value that the models leave open to 
bilateral negotiations.
The dataset was developed in consultation with an advisory 
group of tax professionals, some of whom were experienced 
treaty negotiators. Of particular importance, it includes 
the large majority of those items listed in the Platform for 
Collaboration on Tax’s toolkit (PCT 2021, 13).
> > >  A D V A N C E M E N T S  R E F L E C T E D 
I N  T H E  T A X  T R E A T I E S  E X P L O R E R 
D A T A S E T
This new dataset builds on the ActionAid Tax Treaties 
Dataset, published by ActionAid and the ICTD and discussed 
in an ICTD working paper (Hearson 2016). Benefiting from 
feedback on the ActionAid dataset and support to develop the 
revised dataset from expert advisers and other stakeholders, 
the new dataset represents three main improvements on the 
previous one: 
• Much wider coverage. The dataset incorporates five 
times as many treaties as the earlier ActionAid Tax Treaties 
Dataset and uses a larger sample of LMICs—a concerted 
effort to code older treaties that were previously omitted 
because they did not follow the structure of the OECD 
and UN models—and includes amending protocols and 
multilateral treaties. Feedback from revenue officials in 
francophone lower-income countries, for example, stressed 
that including colonial-era treaties that are still in force, as well 
as regional multilateral agreements, was essential to provide 
a comprehensive picture. Nonetheless, some treaties are still 
uncoded, either because the text was not available in English, 
French, or Spanish, or because they were so different in 
content and structure from the modern-day model tax treaties 
that coding was impossible. 
4. Data in this working paper apply to version 2.0.4. of the dataset. Check https://treaties.tax/data for subsequent updates.
5.     The full list of economies whose treaties are comprehensively included in the dataset is as follows: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, the Central African Repub-
lic, Chad, China, Colombia, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kosovo, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South 
Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza, the Republic of Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. A few of these 
countries are not mentioned in the dataset because they had not concluded any tax treaties as of January 1, 2020.
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6. See https://www.treaties.tax/files/tax-treaties-dataset-coding-book.pdf. 
• Alteration of the provisions covered to focus on the 
most pertinent business taxation provisions. In particular, the 
WHT rates for interest on loans from financial institutions, 
copyright royalties, and royalties for the use of equipment 
are all now included as separate fields in addition to the main 
rates for these two categories. 
• Development of an online interface. Users can interact 
with the data directly at http://www.treaties.tax. Experience 
with the ActionAid dataset indicated that manipulation of the 
Microsoft Excel file was a barrier to access for many users.
To ensure accuracy, each treaty was coded twice, 
independently, by two different members of the project team. 
Coders were recruited from universities with master’s degree 
programs in law, and they were either recent graduates or 
current students who had completed courses in tax treaty law. 
The coders’ early work was comprehensively checked until 
they achieved a satisfactory level of accuracy. 
The dataset also uses a purposive interpretation, which 
means that coders were asked to take account of the intention 
of nonstandard wording rather than simply checking for the 
presence of specific phrases. Guidance on how to code 
common nonstandard formulations was prepared with support 
from the advisory group, and coders were asked to flag any 
nonstandard clauses for verification of their interpretation. The 
agreement rate between coders after initial data cleaning was 
95.4 percent. Disagreements and queries were then resolved 
by the project lead, consulting with the advisory group.
> > >  C A V E A T S  A N D  L I M I T A T I O N S
It is worth discussing several caveats and limitations to the 
dataset. To begin with, claims about provisions of individual 
treaties drawn from this dataset should always be checked 
against the treaty text, because the dataset is designed 
for high-level comparisons rather than to give a precise or 
comprehensive account of the legal position. Other caveats 
to keep in mind when using the dataset are coding limitations 
and the absence of domestic tax considerations.
>>>  CODING LIMITATIONS
The coding structure eliminates nuance and heterogeneity 
by coding each provision with a single word or number. This 
approach is appropriate because the dataset deliberately 
includes treaty provisions that appear uniformly in most 
treaties, but there are sometimes exceptions. For example, 
the dataset gives two dividend WHT rates as well as the 
threshold for the recipient’s share of ownership that qualifies 
for the lower rate. Some treaties have three or more rates or 
use a different type of eligibility criterion for the lower rate. 
An online code book explains how the most common variations 
were treated.6 Some coding errors and inconsistencies may 
remain, although the double coding approach should limit 
their number. Where they persist, this will usually be because 
both coders made the same error, which is especially the case 
where treaties contain nonstandard wording. 
Certain important clauses are also missing entirely from the 
dataset because of the wide variation in drafting that makes 
it hard to code reliably. One example involves “tax sparing” 
provisions within the article covering double taxation relief, 
which significantly influenced many negotiations by LMICs 
and have been found in one study to affect flows of investment 
(Azémar and Dharmapala 2019). 
In addition, despite the aim of purposive interpretation, 
coding rules based on the model treaties could fail to capture 
the interaction between provisions included for consideration 
and others that may have a similar effect if drafted in a 
nonstandard way. Nonstandard wording also inevitably leads 
to some subjectivity in the interpretation of treaty provisions. 
Wherever possible, guidance on these issues was flagged 
in advance in the guidance given to coders or was applied 
retrospectively if issues arose during spot checks.
For example, WHTs on technical service fees (Article 12A) 
are usually provided for in stand-alone articles but may be 
included within the royalties article. In the latter case, they 
may simply be incorporated within the definition of royalties or 
included as a separate paragraph later on. They may also be 
provided for through a protocol appended to the treaty when it 
was concluded, with no mention in the main body of the treaty 
at all. 
Another example involves Article 13 (capital gains), for 
which the dataset includes fields related to the inclusion 
of paragraphs 4 and 5 (respectively, gains on a “land rich” 
company and gains not in that category). This assumes that, 
following the UN and OECD models, this article defaults to 
residence taxation. In some cases, however, the article 
defaults to source taxation, in which case paragraphs 4 and 
5 may not be required for the source country to have a taxing 
right over the income concerned. In cases such as these, the 
code book online indicates how values have been captured.
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>>>  ABSENCE OF DOMESTIC TAX CONSIDERATIONS
As discussed earlier, much useful analysis of tax treaties 
requires consideration of countries’ domestic tax systems, 
which the dataset does not incorporate at this stage. For 
example, the WHT rates in the dataset are absolute values. Yet 
a 10 percent maximum in a treaty may result in considerable 
forgone tax revenue for a country whose domestic rate is 20 
percent, whereas it would have no impact on revenues for a 
country whose domestic rate is 8 percent.
 
Article 13, paragraph 4 (gains on a “land rich” company), can 
facilitate the imposition of capital gains tax on indirect transfers 
of assets but only in the presence of appropriate provisions 
in the domestic tax code (PCT 2020). Conversely, in certain 
cases, domestic antiavoidance legislation or jurisprudence 
might allow for an extensive interpretation of a treaty in the 
absence of a paragraph such as 13(4). 
Of course, the sacrifice of taxing rights is the same regardless 
of domestic law. A country with an 8 percent WHT rate today 
may have had a higher rate in the past, just as it may want 
to increase its rate in the future. Likewise, a country with no 
capital gains tax at the time it signs a treaty may subsequently 
introduce one.
> > >  I N D E X E S  T H A T  S U P P O R T  T R E A T Y 
C O M P A R I S O N S
As well as using the dataset to look across the detail of 
negotiated tax treaties, it can also be used to amalgamate 
a treaty’s content into expressions of its overall protection 
for source taxing rights. These indexes are useful, albeit 
rough, starting points for treaty comparisons. To create them, 
each clause in the treaty was assigned a value between 0 
and 1, where 1 represents a greater taxing right over inward 
investment. Indexes are the averages of these values over a 
particular group of clauses, as follows:
• Index of source taxing rights: incorporates all fields 
in the dataset that relate to the balance of taxing rights. 
It is calculated as the average of the PE, WHT, and “Other 
provisions” indexes. It gives a high-level overview of the treaty.
• Index of PE definition: includes fields related to PE, 
which refers to the threshold above which a foreign company’s 
presence in a country becomes taxable. It is drawn from Article 
5 of the model treaties. 
• Index of WHT rates: averages the WHT rates in each 
treaty. These are taxes imposed on cross-border investment, 
which treaties either prevent or limit to a maximum rate. These 
are Articles 10 to 12A of the model treaties. Each of the four 
types of payment (dividends, interest, royalties, and technical 
service fees) receives equal weighting, but within each type, 
the values in the dataset are averaged.
• Index of other provisions: includes the remaining 
fields, drawn from Articles 7, 8, 13, 16, and 21 of the models.
• UN index: employs a strict analysis of only the 
provisions that vary between the UN and OECD models, as 
they stood in 2017. It excludes, for example, WHT rates (since 
these are not specified in the UN model), but it does include 
Article 12A (“Fees for Technical Services”) or an equivalent 
taxing right. Shipping, where the UN model gives two options, 
receives half weighting.
Beyond the calculations described above, the indexes 
based on the dataset do not employ any weighting strategy. 
Defending the right to impose certain taxes will be much more 
important to some countries, at certain points in time, than to 
others. It is impossible to take this into account, and so the 
indexes do not attempt to establish a hierarchy of provisions. 
Consequently, the indexes provide high-level comparisons 
that point to trends meriting further investigation.
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>  >  >




Index: PE Definition 
5(3)(a)C Construction PE Length (Months)*
5(3)(a)S Supervisory Activities Associated with Construction*
5(3)(b) Service PE Length (Months)*
5(4)(a) No Delivery Facility Exception to PE*
5(4)(b) No Delivery Stock Exception to PE*
5(5)(b) Stock Agent in PE*
5(6) Insurance Broker in P*
5(7) Dependent Agent Extension to PE*
Index: WHT Rate
10(2)(a)Q Qualifying [FDI] Dividend WHT Rate (%)
10(2)(b) Other [Portfolio] Dividend WHT Rate (%)
11(2) General Interest WHT (%)
11(2)F Interest WHT Rate Applying to Loans from Banks and Financial Institutions
12(2) General Royalties WHT Rate (%)
12(2)C Royalties WHT Rate Applying to Payments for Copyright (%)
12(2)E Royalties WHT Rate Applying to Payments for the Use of Equipment (%)
12A Management or Technical Service Fees WHT Rate (%)*
Index: Other Provisions
7(1)(b&c) Limited Force of Attraction*
7(3) No Deduction for Payments to Head Office*
8(2) Source Shipping Right*
13(4) Source Capital Gains on “Land Rich” Company*
13(5) Source Capital Gains on Shares Other than those Covered by 13(4)*
14 Independant Personal Services Included*
16(2) Source Taxation of Earnings by Top-Level Managerial Officials*
21(3) Source Taxation of Other Income*
Excluded from Indexes
10(2)(a)T Threshold for Qualified Dividends
25B(5) Mandatory Binding Arbitration
27 Assistance in Tax Collection
29 Entitlement to Benefits
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/.
Note: The dataset’s overall “Index of source taxing rights” is a high-level overview of taxing rights, calculated as the average of the PE, WHT, 
and “Other provisions” indexes shown in the table. Provisions marked with an asterisk (*) are included in the UN index. FDI = foreign direct 
investment; PE = permanent establishment; WHT = withholding tax.
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7. Countries of the former USSR have been excluded from this quantitative analysis because of their distorting effect on historical data (Barthel et al. 2010). 
Half (51 percent) of tax treaties in the Tax Treaties Explorer 
dataset are more than 20 years old (concluded before 2000 
and not updated since), and about 10 percent date from 
before 1980. In this time, negotiation practice and the norms 
set out in the model conventions have changed significantly—
in ways that strengthen treaties against abuse and, in some 
instances, expand source taxation rights. The new dataset 
allows us to develop stylized findings about these trends and 
clarify existing assumptions. 
The charts that follow display trends over time across all 
treaties in the dataset.7 Solid lines represent all treaties in 
force at a given time, considering preindependence treaties, 
new treaties, renegotiations, and terminations. They show 
how LMICs’ taxing rights are affected by all their treaties in 
force and the gradual impact of changes in negotiating norms. 
Individual dots show average values for treaties signed each 
year. These dots show the outcome of negotiations by LMICs 
and are more sensitive to trends in negotiating norms and 
more volatile than the average content of treaties in force, 
since the latter also includes treaties concluded in the past. A 
treaty that is reflected in the dots will only change the direction 
of the line when it becomes effective. 
> > >  W I T H H O L D I N G  T A X E S , 
P E R M A N E N T  E S T A B L I S H M E N T ,  A N D 
T H E  O V E R A L L  B A L A N C E  O F  T A X I N G 
R I G H T S
As an IMF analysis points out, WHT rates in new tax treaties 
have been “trending down” in past decades, alongside WHT 
and corporate income tax rates in domestic law (IMF 2014, 
26). The new dataset allows us to clarify the reasons behind 
this finding in three ways. 
First, the decline in WHT rates in the overall stock of treaties 
only begins in the mid-1990s because of the persistence of 
treaties signed in the 1980s and before with higher rates. 
Furthermore, the aggregate pattern in newly signed treaties 
is less of a downward trend and more of a structural change 
occurring in the early 1990s. This pattern is exaggerated by 
data artifacts caused by the breakup of the former USSR 
(Barthel et al. 2010), but it persists once they are excluded, as 
in the charts that follow. The drivers of this change merit further 
study. Overall, WHT rates in treaties peaked in 1994, and the 
treaty network today is on a par the rates that prevailed during 
the 1980s. 
Second, in contrast to the decline in WHT rates, the trend 
across other provisions of tax treaties is toward greater 
retention of source taxing rights. Figure 1 shows the evolution 
in treaties’ provisions for overall source taxing rights, showing 
that the overall index was increasing in value until 1994, after 
which it largely flattened. Underlying this early growth was the 
continued strengthening of source taxing rights in provisions 
other than WHT rates, which since 1994 has balanced out 
the decline in those rates. Indeed, the index measuring PE 
definitions shows a quite consistent rise throughout the past 
half century. The trends in PE and WHT point to a shift from 
gross to net basis taxation, which may be more challenging 
for resource-constrained revenue authorities (Leduc and 
Michielse 2021).
Third, Figure 2, which examines WHT rates in the stock of 
agreements in force, shows that the decline in the past three 
decades is most pronounced regarding dividends. Where they 
are provided for, rates on technical service fees have also 
declined, but provision for such taxes has also become much 
more common in treaties. In contrast, the decline in average 
interest and royalty rates in the stock of treaties as a whole 
has been relatively small, and these rates are still comparable 
with rates found during the 1980s. As for new treaties signed, 
the averages during the 1970s and 1980s were similar for 
qualifying dividends, interest, and royalties at 12 percent. 
By the 2010s, the qualifying dividends rate had fallen to an 
average of 7 percent compared with 9 percent for interest and 
royalties.
Figure 3 sheds more light on the expansion of PE definitions. 
Provisions allowing for source taxation of the delivery of goods 
are the only ones coded in the dataset to have become less 
common, while the others show a growth in popularity over 
time. The time threshold for construction and service PE 
definitions has also declined, as will be discussed later.
> >  H I S T O R I C A L  L E G A C I E S ,  C U R R E N T  T R E N D S
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F I G U R E  1  - Changes in Indexes Measuring the Overall Balance of Taxing Rights, 1970-2019
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/.
Note: The dataset’s “Index of source taxing rights” is a high-level overview of taxing rights, comprising the averages of the PE definition, WHT 
rate, and “Other provisions” indexes. Solid lines designate all treaties in force at a given time, whereas individual dots designate the average 
index values for treaties signed in each year.
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F I G U R E  2  - Evolution of Main WHT Rates within Treaties in Force, 1970-2019
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/.
Note: Lines designate averages of all treaties in force at a given time. Legend designates treaty article numbers pertaining to respective 
withholding tax (WHT) rates. 
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F I G U R E  3  - Evolution of Various PE Provisions within Treaties in Force, 1970-2019
> > >  I M P A C T  O F  M U LT I L A T E R A L 
N E G O T I A T I O N S  O N  B I L A T E R A L 
T R E A T I E S
>>> CHANGES TO THE MODEL CONVENTIONS
Since its first publication in 1980, the UN model has provided 
a template for treaties with expanded source taxing rights, 
and its evolution in subsequent editions has continued in this 
direction. In many instances, however, changes to the UN and 
OECD models formalize innovations that had already become 
prevalent in negotiation practice. Indeed, tax treaty provisions 
can diffuse quite widely even when they are absent from the 
UN and OECD models. Examples in the dataset include the 
following:
• Article 12A (providing for WHTs on technical service 
fees) was adopted in the UN model in 2017, but it was 
becoming increasingly popular before this point, albeit in a 
minority of treaties. Aside from bilateral treaties, it could be 
found in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) multilateral 
treaty of 1994, the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) model treaty of 2011, and the ATAF model of 2016 
before its inclusion in the UN model.
• Both the OECD and UN model conventions now 
include paragraph 13(4), which allows for source taxation of 
gains from the alienation of shares in companies whose value 
derives predominantly from immovable assets—a protection 
against tax avoidance through offshore indirect transfers of 
assets. Paragraph 13(4) was present in the first UN model 
published in 1980 but was only introduced into the OECD 
model in 2003. 
• The two multilateral models only acquired general 
Entitlement to Benefits (antiabuse) clauses in 2017, although 
some countries have pursued such clauses in their treaties for 
many years.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of these three provisions 
within the dataset’s sample of treaties. As before, the 
proportion of treaties signed in a given year that include each 
provision is shown as a dot, while the proportion of treaties 
in force is shown as a line. Each of the three provisions 
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/. 
Note: Lines designate averages of all treaties in force at a given time. Legend designates treaty article and paragraph numbers pertaining to 
respective components of the permanent establishment (PE) definition.
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increased in prevalence over the past four decades, even 
before its adoption in model treaties. In the case of Articles 
12A and 29, inclusion in a model convention for the first time 
appears to lead to a significant increase in the proportion of 
treaties including it. The inclusion of article 13(4) in the OECD 
model does not appear to change the overall trend, which is 
unsurprising given that it was already present in the UN model. 
The other trend illustrated in Figure 4 is the substantial 
lag between changes in current negotiating practice and the 
body of treaties still in force. The proportion of new treaties 
containing article 13(4)— source capital gains on “land rich” 
company—is consistently around 20 percentage points higher 
than those in force. The exponential growth in Entitlement 
to Benefits clauses is even more pronounced. Despite their 
inclusion in most of the treaties signed in the past few years, 
fewer than 10 percent of those in force included such clauses 
prior to MLI implementation. Keeping unrevised older treaties 
in force thus risks revenue losses both through exposure to 
abuse and through the absence of provisions securing source 
taxing rights that have now become commonplace. As the 
African Tax Administration Forum argues, “Africa is still beset 
by serious issues such as . . . tax treaties with no appropriate 
tax allocation rights between source and residence taxation 
and thus susceptible to abuse” (ATAF 2019, 15). 
The growing gap between old treaties and present-day 
needs can be understood as a result of several interlinked 
processes. At the global level, changes to the models are 
based on iterative learning, evolving economic activity, the 
emergence of new tax planning practices, and some normative 
shifts. At the country level, they may respond to changing 
patterns of economic relations, modifications to tax systems 
(especially the introduction of new taxes), stronger negotiating 
capacity, changing political priorities, and lessons learned 
from the application of treaties. There is ample evidence that 
past negotiations by lower-income countries have suffered 
from capacity deficits, lack of preparation, and pressure from 
political actors who did not take into account the full impact of 
treaties on future revenues (Hearson 2021; Irish 1974; Mutava 
2019).
>  >  >
F I G U R E  4  - Presence of New Model Treaty Provisions (Excluding Changes due to MLI), 1980-2019
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/. 
Note: Solid lines designate all treaties in force at a given time, whereas individual dots designate the average index values for treaties signed in 
each year. BEPS = base erosion and profit shifting; MLI = OECD/G-20 Multilateral Instrument to Implement Treaty-Related Aspects of BEPS; 
OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; UN = United Nations; WHT = withholding tax. 
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> > >  T H E  M U LT I L A T E R A L  I N S T R U M E N T
In 2017, members of the OECD/G-20 IF on BEPS tried a 
new approach to make treaty norms filter through more quickly 
into treaties already in force. The Multilateral Instrument to 
Implement Treaty-Related Aspects of BEPS (“MLI”) offers 
the potential to make wide-ranging changes to tax treaties, 
including in four provisions measured in the dataset.
 
Figure 5 shows the impact of the MLI on all treaties covered 
by the dataset regarding four provisions that are captured 
in the dataset. Figure 6 shows the impact specifically on 
the treaties of five lower-income countries that have already 
ratified the MLI. For three of these provisions, the MLI largely 
consolidates changes in the treaty network that have been 
under way for decades. This is especially the case because 
countries choose which of their treaties are to be covered by 
the MLI and can also opt out of many of its provisions.
 
Unless countries’ MLI reservations reflect changes to their 
treaty policy, its effects are limited. For Articles 13(4) and 5(7), 
the MLI reflects a longstanding preference on the part of lower-
income countries that is already found in most of their treaties. 
Nonetheless, the MLI has added Article 13(4) to around 10 
percent of the treaties in force in the countries featured in 
Figure 6. Conversely, few LMICs have opted into mandatory 
binding arbitration, meaning that it has little impact here. 
The standout difference is the Entitlement to Benefits article, 
which treaties amended by the MLI must include in some 
form. Here, the MLI has amended the body of treaties in force 
almost overnight, increasing the prevalence of this article to 
a level comparable with that in newly signed treaties. Among 
the five sample countries, the MLI has already increased the 
prevalence of this article from 14 percent to 61 percent of the 
treaties in force.
>  >  >
F I G U R E  5  - Dataset Treaties in Force: Impact of the MLI, 1970-2019
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/. 
Note: Solid lines designate all treaties in force at a given time, whereas the four individual dots designate the impact of the MLI on current treaties 
if all countries’ published positions were to be ratified and come into force. BEPS = base erosion and profit shifting; MLI = OECD/G-20 Multilateral 
Instrument to Implement Treaty-Related Aspects of BEPS; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; UN = United 
Nations; WHT = withholding tax.
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>  >  >
F I G U R E  6  - Impact of the MLI, 1970-2019, on Five Ratifying Lower-Income Countries: Burkina Faso, Arab 
Republic of Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan 
> > >  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  P R A C T I C E  O N 
P E  T H R E S H O L D S
While some suggest that lower-income countries would be 
best served by radically overhauling or abandoning the tax 
treaty system altogether (Dagan 2000; Paolini et al. 2016; 
Pistone 2010; Shepherd 2013), for many countries the 
pragmatic response will be to identify the treaties of most 
concern and seek to renegotiate them in line with the best 
precedent currently available. For example, an IMF technical 
assistance report studied Mongolia’s tax treaty network and 
made recommendations for action. It concluded, regarding 
double tax agreements (DTAs), “In the current situation, only 
a few DTAs can be considered potentially harmful as they 
insufficiently protect the Mongolian tax base . . . Mongolia 
should take a more differentiated approach toward repairing its 
DTA network by selectively (re-) negotiating and/or amending 
its current DTAs” (Michielse 2012, 5).
The Mongolian government eventually terminated four 
treaties, apparently because it did not receive satisfactory 
responses to its requests to renegotiate. These were with 
Kuwait, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
As the IMF report makes clear, however, certain aspects 
of Mongolia’s other treaties should give cause for concern. 
For example, several treaties are “unusual[ly] generous 
compared with international standards” because they set 
minimum periods of time for construction and service PEs 
in excess of 12 months. Bearing in mind the domestic law’s 
thresholds of 6 months and 3 months, respectively, the IMF 
report recommends that the construction PE threshold “should 
not be less than the time period used in [domestic law] (i.e., 
6 months), and try to limit this time period to 12 months (i.e., 
the internationally acceptable time period)” while the service 
PE should always be included in treaties and “should not be 
extended to more than 6 months (to comply with international 
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/. 
Note: Solid lines designate all treaties in force at a given time, whereas the four individual dots designate the impact of the MLI on current treaties 
if all countries’ published positions were to be ratified and come into force. BEPS = base erosion and profit shifting; MLI = OECD/G-20 Multilateral 
Instrument to Implement Treaty-Related Aspects of BEPS; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; UN = United 
Nations; WHT = withholding tax.
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practice)” (Michielse 2012, 8).
Analysis of the new Tax Treaties Explorer dataset confirms 
these notions of international practice. It is indeed exceptionally 
rare to find thresholds in excess of 12 months in any treaties in 
force (Figure 7). For construction PE, the mode is a 6-month 
threshold, although it is 12 months in around a quarter of 
treaties. For service PE, it is rare to include a threshold longer 
than 6 months. That said, only around half of treaties in force 
have a service PE provision at all. 
>  >  >
F I G U R E  5  - Construction and Service PE Thresholds within Treaties in Force, 2020
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/. 
Note: The permanent establishment (PE) thresholds shown are the minimum periods of time for construction and service PEs, respectively. “Not 
included” refers to the number of treaties that contain no such provisions. 
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Figure 8 adds an important piece of context to this. While 
the average thresholds for construction and service PE have 
stabilized at 8 months and 6 months, respectively, only half of 
treaties currently in force include the service PE provision, but 
it is becoming much more common. Since the mid-2000s, two-
thirds of new treaties in the dataset have included a service 
PE provision. 
Mongolia’s treaty with China is singled out in the IMF 
report because both its PE thresholds are unusually long, 
at 18 months (Michielse 2012). The dataset shows that this 
threshold is also unusually high for China: it has 45 treaties 
in force in the dataset, and of these only the treaties with 
Mongolia, Sudan, and Ukraine have 18-month thresholds. 
(In Sudan’s case, only the construction PE threshold is 18 
months.) These three treaties are all more than 20 years old. 
The IMF report notes that although Mongolian law considers 
a person who habitually maintains a stock of goods or 
merchandise from which they regularly deliver goods and 
merchandise on behalf of a foreign enterprise to constitute a 
PE, most of its tax treaties do not. It would be worth noting 
here that the stock agent provision is the only source-favoring 
PE provision to have consistently declined in prevalence over 
the past 50 years (Figure 3).
>  >  >
F I G U R E  8  - Evolution of Construction and Service PE Provisions, 1970-2019
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/. 
Note: The left axis indicator refers to minimum periods for construction and service permanent establishment (PE) thresholds, respectively. Solid 
lines designate all treaties in force at a given time, whereas individual dots designate the average index values for treaties signed in each year. 
The dashed line (measured by the right axis) indicates the proportion of treaties in force that include a service PE provision.
25USING NEW DATA TO SUPPORT TAX TREATY NEGOTIATION <<<
> > >  E X P E R I E N C E  W I T H 
R E N E G O T I A T I O N S
The Tax Treaty Explorer dataset includes numerous 
examples of renegotiations, through amending instruments as 
well as terminations and replacements of treaties altogether. 
In Figure 9, all renegotiations by lower-income countries 
are plotted showing the value of the index of overall source 
taxing rights: the value before renegotiation is on the x-axis 
and following it on the y-axis. The solid line is at 45 degrees, 
indicating values that are the same on both axes. Treaties 
above (below) the line have a higher (lower) index value 
following the renegotiation, indicating that the renegotiation 
strengthened (weakened) source taxing rights. 
The chart shows that all renegotiations that began from a 
treaty whose index value was below 0.4—especially restrictive 
treaties—led to an expansion of source taxing rights. 
Conversely, when treaties whose index value was above 
0.7 were renegotiated, the result was a weakening of source 
taxing rights. Most renegotiations are, however, clustered 
around the diagonal line, suggesting only a modest change 
in the overall balance of taxing rights that may be below the 
sensitivity of the index approach.
>  >  >
F I G U R E  9  - Impact on the Overall Source Taxing Rights from Lower-Income Countries’ Treaty Renegotiations 
since 2010
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/. 
Note: The dataset’s index of overall source taxing rights (on a 0–1 scale) provides a high-level overview of taxing rights, comprising the averages 
of the permanent establishment (PE) definition, withholding tax (WHT) rate, and “Other provisions” indexes. “Lower-income” countries are those 
falling within the low- and lower-middle-income categories as defined by the World Bank. Countries are labeled using ISO alpha-3 codes.
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The two most radical renegotiations in a source-based 
direction were those by Kenya and Rwanda with Mauritius. 
Alongside the terminated treaties with Senegal and Zambia, 
these were among the most residence-based of all Mauritius’s 
treaties. Table 3 summarizes each, and Annex A provides a 
detailed breakdown of the treaties. The two new treaties are 
among the most source-based, and it should be noted that 
Rwanda’s treaty was terminated before these renegotiations, 
while Kenya’s had been struck down by its High Court. 
Mauritius conceded significantly expanded PE definitions 
in both cases, including a halving of the construction and 
service PE thresholds. Both countries also obtained WHTs 
on technical service fees, a provision found in only four other 
treaties concluded by Mauritius.
 
In terms of WHTs, Rwanda’s treaty is a major improvement 
from its predecessor, which had prohibited WHTs across 
the board. Kenya also obtained taxing rights over ships in 
international traffic, capital gains, and other income, as well 
as an Entitlement to Benefits article. Given the new treaties’ 
content and Mauritius’s position as a conduit jurisdiction 
responsible for significant revenue loss (Beer and Loeprick 
2021), these terminations and renegotiations reflect a 
prioritization based on high costs and risks as well as potential 
for improvement. Among capital importers from Mauritius, only 
the Republic of Congo has a more residence-based treaty still 
in force (also shown in Annex A).8
8. The Mauritius-Tunisia treaty is more residence-based than Mauritius’s treaties with Senegal and Zambia, but data from the IMF’s annual Coordinated Direct Investment 
Survey (2000) indicate that Tunisia is a net exporter of capital to Mauritius.
>  >  >
T A B L E  3  - Selected Treaties with Mauritius
COUNTRY A DATE OF SIGNATURE STATUS SOURCE WHT RATES PE DEF OTHER
Kenya
2012 Not in Force 0.37 0.30 0.44 0.38
2019 Not in Force 0.78 0.50 0.97 0.88
Rwanda
2001 Terminated 0.19 0.00 0.31 0.25
2013 In Force 0.57 0.48 0.84 0.38
Senegal 2002 Terminated 0.23 0.00 0.45 0.25
Zambia 2011 Terminated 0.22 0.29 0.20 0.17
Congo, Rep. 2010 In Force 0.18 0.09 0.31 0.13
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/.
Note: PE = permanent establishment; WHT = withholding tax.
Two of the renegotiations that impose greater restrictions on 
taxing rights are India’s, with Norway in 2011 and Romania in 
2013. These appear to reflect a change in India’s negotiating 
policy around 2000, toward a less source-based position: 
WHT rates have fallen dramatically, and several source-
based provisions—including the UN limited force of attraction 
provision in Article 7(i) and source taxation of shipping in 
Article 8—are now rarely found in new treaties signed by 
India, except a few with LMICs. 
In contrast, both renegotiations resulted in the removal 
of taxing rights over indirect transfers of assets through 
paragraph 13(4) of the model treaties, which is found in the 
large majority of India’s new treaties since 2000. Instead, 
the renegotiated treaty with Romania accommodated India’s 
apparent priority of expanded taxing rights over gains from 
the sales of Indian companies under a provision similar to 
paragraph 13(5) of the UN model, which was already found 
in the Norway treaty. Notably, both these renegotiations also 
introduced an Entitlement to Benefits clause, which has been 
found consistently in India’s new treaties for the past decade. 
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> > >  N E W  N E G O T I A T I N G  P A R T N E R S
Figure 10 shows new treaties signed by lower-income 
countries with some of the most prolific negotiators in recent 
years. The top panel shows India and China’s treaties, 
illustrating that, since 2010, the mid 2000s, the two have 
diverged considerably, India now concluding more source-
based treaties, and China more residence-based treaties. 
Decomposing this further shows that the overall WHT 
settlements for the two countries are similar, whereas India’s 
recent treaties have much more expansive PE definitions than 
do China’s. 
The second panel illustrates treaties with several gulf 
states, which now have wide treaty networks with lower-
income countries, reflecting the interests of sovereign wealth 
funds, airlines, and the oil industry. Notably, many of these 
countries do not tax income and so the risk of double taxation 
may be especially low. The finding here is that treaties’ content 
is much more varied overall, with some treaties scoring low in 
the index. All these treaties have relatively low or zero WHT 
rates, but their PE definitions are much more heterogeneous.
>  >  >
F I G U R E  1 0  - Index of Source Taxing Rights for New Treaties Signed by Lower-Income Countries and Selected 
Countries
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer, https://tinyurl.com/yjlvvakg (panel a) and https://tinyurl.com/yjdj6z9x (panel b). 
Note: The scatterplot represents data from the index of overall source taxing rights, which covers all coded clauses that relate to the balance 
of taxing rights, comprising the averages of the permanent establishment (PE) definition, withholding tax (WHT) rate, and “Other provisions” 
indexes. It gives a high-level overview of the treaty. Each dot designates an individual treaty between one of the specified countries with a lower-
income country that was signed in a given year. “Lower-income” countries are those falling within the low- and lower-middle-income categories 
as defined by the World Bank. 
a. India and China, 1960-2020
b. Selected Persian Gulf States, 1990-2020
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As noted earlier, much academic literature is animated by the 
question of how tax treaties affect business decisions. From a 
policy perspective, a key question is whether a new treaty can 
be expected to increase the stock of investment between the 
treaty partners. The answer, we suggested, depends on the 
terms of the treaty and the identity of the treaty partners, as 
well as on the two countries’ existing treaty networks and the 
characteristics of their tax systems.
 
Here we examine the first part of the puzzle: how do the 
terms of a treaty shape its impact on FDI? Given the increasing 
sophistication of the literature on this topic, our aim in what 
follows is simply to demonstrate how the Tax Treaties Explorer 
dataset can help build on existing findings by replicating a 
previous study and replacing the binary independent variable 
measuring the presence of a treaty with variables based on the 
dataset. Our proof-of-concept study suggests that only lower 
treaty WHT rates are positively associated with FDI stocks. 
This finding should be tested using more recent innovations in 
data and methodology.
Our starting point is a 10-year-old study that finds that tax 
treaties positively affect investment flows (Barthel, Busse, 
and Neumayer 2009). We chose this study because its 
sample overlaps well with treaties in the dataset, its model 
is straightforward to replicate, and the authors have made 
the data to do so available online. Briefly, the original study 
is a dyadic panel data model, using dyadic fixed effects, that 
examines the impact of tax treaties on bilateral FDI stocks. 
The authors conclude that a tax treaty between two countries 
increases the stock of FDI by approximately 30 percent and 
that treaties’ effect on the stock of FDI increases with age. 
This is a large effect size and may be prone to overestimation 
because it does not account for treaty shopping.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we recreate 
the model from the study of Barthel, Busse, and Neumayer 
(2009), using their replication data but inserting revised data 
on effective treaties, drawn from the Tax Treaties Explorer 
dataset. Second, with respect to those dyads in which a treaty 
is in force, we examine how the treaty’s content increases or 
reduces its impact on FDI to determine which provisions that 
favor source state taxation can be included in a treaty without 
affecting FDI stocks.
> > >  R E P L I C A T I N G  T H E  F D I  I M P A C T 
M O D E L  W I T H  N E W  D A T A
In the first stage of the analysis, the impact of a treaty on FDI 
is captured as a dummy variable indicating that a tax treaty 
is effective. During the period of 1978 to 2003, our sample 
includes 1,814 dyads and 547 tax treaties. 
Our approach makes three small changes from the baseline 
of Barthel, Busse, and Neumayer (2009). First, in common 
with that study, we take the year of effectiveness as the start of 
the treaty’s effect on FDI. In contrast to it, however, where the 
treaty becomes effective retrospectively—that is, the effective 
date is earlier than the signed date—we use the date of 
signature. Our rationale here is that any investors influenced 
by the presence of a treaty may be unwilling to commit 
capital until it has been signed. Second, we account for treaty 
terminations, setting the value of the dummy to zero in years 
after a treaty ceases to be effective. Finally, where there is 
a disagreement between the Barthel, Busse, and Neumayer 
(2009) dataset and the Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, we use 
the latter.
We report the results of three models in Table 4. The full 
methodology and data sources are outlined by Barthel, 
Busse, and Neumayer (2009), but, in summary, the first two 
models are a standard panel regression using dyadic fixed-
effects, where each dyad of countries has its own intercept 
and for which we use standard errors clustered on dyads. 
The dynamic model differs from the static in that we include 
the lagged value of the dependent variable, which reduces 
any overestimation of results due to the dynamic effect of FDI 
(Egger and Merlo 2007). We also replicate a third model from 
Barthel, Busse, and Neumayer (2009), based on the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator, which is used to correct any presence of Nickell 
(1981) bias that may arise in the dynamic estimator and also 
to take into account any possible endogeneity. The number 
of lagged instruments is restricted to six. Following Barthel, 
Busse, and Neumayer (2009), the results in column (3) use 
the age of a treaty instead of the dummy. 
> >  R E P L I C A T I O N  S T U D Y :  T A X  T R E A T I E S  A N D  F D I
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The results are consistent with those presented in Barthel et 
al. (2010), with the coefficients for the presence of a tax treaty 
in all three models positively and significantly associated with 
higher FDI stocks. The coefficients translate into effect sizes 
as follows: having a tax treaty in effect increases the stock 
of FDI in a dyad by 47 percent in the static model, or around 
20 percent over the long term in the dynamic model. In the 
original paper, these figures were both around 30 percent.9
> > >  A P P LY I N G  D A T A S E T  I N D E X E S  T O 
D Y A D S  W I T H  T R E A T I E S  I N  F O R C E
Our next step is to replace the binary tax treaty variable with 
the indexes discussed earlier in the paper. These apply only to 
dyads for which a tax treaty was effective. It should be noted 
that value of the indexes for a given dyad may vary as treaties 
are amended or renegotiated. In Table 5, columns 4–6 show 
the results for the same three types of model as in the pure 
replication, but the main independent variable is now the index 
of overall source taxing rights. Columns 7–9 show the partial 
effects of the three subindexes that make up the overall index: 
withholding tax rates (“WHT rates”), permanent establishment 
definition (“PE def”), and other clauses affecting the balance 
between source and residence taxation (“Other”). Columns 
10–12 show the results using the index of similarity to the UN 
model treaty as the independent variable.
In columns 4 and 5, the index of overall source taxing rights 
is negatively and significantly associated with the stock of FDI 
in both the static and dynamic models, suggesting that greater 
protection for source taxing rights reduces the stock of FDI. 
Concretely, switching one treaty clause from the least to most 
source-based text included in the dataset reduces the stock 
of FDI by around 2 percent. In columns 7–9, it is WHT rates 
that most convincingly affect FDI stocks once we attempt to 
compensate for overestimation, Nickel bias and endogeneity, 
>  >  >







DTT (dummy) (t) 0.386***(0.088)
0.096**
(0.038)




BIT Age (t) -0.000(0.009)
(ln) FDI Stock (t-1) 0.760***(0.030)
0.715***
(0.052)

























Observations 20,762 18,019 15,859
R-Squared 0.182 0.643
Number of Dyads 1,814 1,671 1,560
AR2 (p-value) 0.516
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. BIT = bilateral investment treaties; DTT = double taxation treaty; FDI = foreign direct investment; 
FE = fixed effects; GMM = generalized method of moments; p.c. = per capita. 
9. For the exact interpretation of the coefficients, we considered the necessary correction for the estimated variance for coefficients of dummy variables in semilogarithmic 
equations, as in Kennedy (1981). 
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as they are negatively and significantly associated with FDI 
stocks in both the dynamic and GMM models. Concretely, in 
the dynamic fixed effects model, an across-the-board reduc-
tion in all types of WHT rate of 1 percentage point would in-
crease the stock of FDI by 2 percent in the short term and by 
3.5 percent over the longer term. The effect size is 4 percent 
in the GMM model.
The limitations of this replication study illustrate the potential 
for future research using the dataset. To begin with, we 
replicated a study whose methodology has been superseded 
in most more-recent publications by the use of microdata or 
network analysis to account for the impact of treaty shopping. 
Furthermore, we were only able to use absolute WHT rates 
in treaties and not the differential between domestic law and 
the treaty rate; similarly, for other provisions, we could not 
compare treaties with the domestic law position at the relevant 
point in time. Our replication study also omits elements of the 
treaty that are not coded but that studies have shown to have 
a greater impact on investment, notably “tax sparing” clauses. 
Finally, we focused only on FDI: it would be interesting to 
consider how portfolio investment as well as trade in goods, 
services, and intellectual property might be affected by 
relevant treaty provisions. 
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Observations 3,263 2,792 2,335 3,262 2,792 2,335 3,202 2,741 2,289
R-Squared 0.279 0.548 0.822 0.281 0.548 0.760 0.274 0.550 0.899
Number of Dyads 438 380 349 438 380 349 431 375 345
AR2 (p-value) 0.822 0.760 0.899
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. BIT = bilateral investment treaty; FDI = foreign direct investment; FE = fixed effects; GMM = 
generalized method of moments; p.c. = per capita; UN = United Nations model treaty; WHT = withholding tax. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The new Tax Treaties Explorer dataset is a powerful tool 
for research by negotiators and policy makers as well as by 
researchers. In this paper, we have illustrated some of the 
new insights that can be drawn from these data, in the hope 
that future research will deepen this analysis. There can be 
no substitute for a detailed legal study of the wording of tax 
treaties and their interaction with countries’ tax systems. 
Nonetheless, in the aggregate, stylized findings of the kind we 
have identified here can inform and empower negotiators from 
lower-income countries.
The necessity of analyzing the recent treaties signed by a 
potential negotiating partner is widely recognized in guidance 
from international organizations. The dataset can assist 
with this task, but it also points to clearer notions of current 
international practice at a more general level. Certain clauses 
that were rarely included in older treaties are now found in 
most lower-income countries’ newly signed agreements as 
well as in model conventions, such as the following:
 
• Inclusion of supervisory activities related to 
construction activities, as well as the services PE clause, in 
Article 5 of the UN model 
• Source taxation of capital gains from sales of shares 
in “land rich” companies, found in Article 13 of the OECD and 
UN models since 2003 
• Addition of the Entitlement to Benefits article to both 
models in 2017. 
In these and other areas, recent practice should embolden 
countries to seek stronger safeguarding of source taxation 
rights in their negotiating positions, as well as provide a 
compelling rationale to renegotiate older agreements that are 
no longer consistent with current practice. Although declining 
WHT rates since the 1990s may give countries cause to doubt 
the benefits from renegotiations, this is counteracted by the 
broadening of PE definitions.
The replication exercise we have conducted here is only a 
proof of concept, and its results should certainly be tested using 
more sophisticated models and a wider range of data, as we 
discussed above. Still, its tentative conclusion suggests that 
WHT rates are the main drivers of any relationship between 
tax treaties and FDI stocks. If this result is confirmed, it would 
suggest that negotiators can seek the maximum protection of 
source taxing rights in other parts of the treaty, knowing that 
this is unlikely to dilute any investment-promoting impact of 
the treaty. Conversely, a capital-importing country that does 
not wish to concede substantial reductions in WHT rates may 
have little reason to negotiate a treaty, since without those 
concessions the impact of the treaty on investment could be 
small. 
As international guidance urges lower-income countries to 
prepare more carefully and critically for negotiations, future 
research using the dataset may offer important guidance.
> >  C O N C L U S I O N
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5(3)(a)C, months 12 6 12 6 9 9 12
5(3)(a)S YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
5(3)(b), months 6 3 12 6 9 NO 12
5(4)(a) YES NO YES NO YES YES YES
5(4)(b) YES NO YES NO YES YES YES
5(5)(b) NO YES NO YES NO NO NO
5(6) YES YES NO YES YES NO NO
5(7) NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
7(1)(b&c) YES YES NO YES NO NO NO
7(3) YES YES YES YES YES NO YES
8(2) NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
10(2)(a)Q,% 5 8 0 10 0 5 0
10(2)(a)T,% 10 - - - - 25 25
10(2)(b),% 10 8 0 10 0 15 5
11(2),% 10 10 0 10 0 10 5
11(2)F,% 10 10 0 10 0 10 5
12(2), % 10 12 0 10 0 5 0
12(2)C, % 10 12 0 10 0 0 0
12(2)E,% 0 12 0 0 0 0 0
12A,% 0 10 0 12 0 0 0
13(4) NO YES NO NO NO - NO
13(5) NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
14 NO NO YES NO YES YES NO
16(2) YES YES NO NO NO NO NO
21(3) NO YES NO YES NO NO NO
25B(5) NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
27 YES YES NO YES NO NO YES
29 NONE PPT NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE
Source: Tax Treaties Explorer dataset, https://www.treaties.tax/.
Note: PPT = principal purpose test; — = not available
> >  A P P E N D I X  A
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